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Abstract
In 2006, Peris-Lopez et al. [1, 2, 3] initiated the design of ultra-
lightweight RFID protocols –with the UMAP family of protocols– involv-
ing only simple bitwise logical or arithmetic operations such as bitwise
XOR, OR, AND, and addition. This combination of operations was re-
vealed later to be insufficient for security. Then, Chien et al. proposed
the SASI protocol [4] with the aim of offering better security, by adding
the bitwise rotation to the set of supported operations. The SASI pro-
tocol represented a milestone in the design of ultralightweight protocols,
although certain attacks have been published against this scheme [5, 6, 7].
In 2008, a new protocol, named Gossamer [8], was proposed that can be
considered a further development of both the UMAP family and SASI.
Although no attacks have been published against Gossamer, Lee et al. [9]
have recently published an alternative scheme that is highly reminiscent of
SASI. In this paper, we show that Lee et al.’s scheme fails short of many
of its security objectives, being vulnerable to several important attacks
like traceability, full disclosure, cloning and desynchronization.
Keywords: RFID, Authentication, Ultralightweight protocols, Crypt-
analysis
1 Introduction
In an RFID system, objects are labelled with a tag. Each tag contains a mi-
crochip with a certain (generally limited) amount of computational and storage
capabilities, and a coupling element. Such devices can be classified according to
their memory type and power source. Another relevant parameter is tag price,
which creates a broad distinction between high-cost and low-cost RFID tags.
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The rule of thumb of gate cost says that every extra 1,000 gates increases chip
price by 1 cent [10].
In [4], Chien proposed a tag classification mainly based on which were the
operations supported on-chip. High-cost tags are divided into two classes: “full-
fledged” and “simple”. Full-fledged tags support on-board conventional cryp-
tography like symmetric encryption, cryptographic one-way functions and even
public key cryptography. Simple tags can support random number generators
and one-way hash functions. Likewise, there are two classes for low-cost RFID
tags.“Lightweight” tags are those whose chip supports a random number gener-
ation and simple functions like a Cyclic Redundancy Checksum (CRC), but not
cryptographic hash function. “Ultralightweight” tags can only compute simple
bitwise operations like XOR, AND, OR, etc.
In this paper we focus in the latter category of ultralightweight tags. These
tags represent the greatest challenge in terms of security, due to their expected
wide deployment and, at the same time, extremely limited capabilities.
2 Related Work
In 2006, Peris et al. proposed a family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authen-
tication Protocols (henceforth referred to as the UMAP family of protocols).
Chronologically, M2AP [1] was the first proposal, followed by EMAP [2] and
LMAP [3]. Although some vulnerabilities were discovered (active attacks [11, 12]
and later on passive attacks [13, 14]) which rendered those first proposals inse-
cure, they were an interesting advance in the field of lightweight cryptography
for low-cost RFID tags.
In 2007, Hung-Yu Chien published a very interesting ultralightweight au-
thentication protocol providing Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity (SASI)
for very low-cost RFID tags [4]. The SASI protocol is highly reminiscent of
the UMAP family, and more concretely, of the LMAP protocol. The main
difference between these two protocols is the inclusion of the rotation in the
set of operations supported by each tag. Indeed, the messages transmitted in
to the insecure channel in UMAP family are computed by the composition of
triangular-functions (e.g. addition modulo 2 or bitwise OR, etc.) -easily imple-
mented in hardware- which finally results in another triangular-function [15]. A
triangular-function has the property that output bits only depend of the left-
most input bits, instead of all input bits. This undesirable characteristic (lack
of diffusion) greatly facilitated the analysis of the messages transmitted in the
UMAP family of protocols, and thus the work of the cryptanalyst.
SASI represented a considerable advance towards the design of a secure ultra-
lightweight protocol. However, certain important attacks have been published.
First, Sun et al. proposed two desynchronization attacks. In [6], it was proposed
a denial-of-service and traceability attack. Then, D’Arco et al. [7] proposed an-
other desynchronization attack and an identity disclosure attack. In [16], Phan
shows how a passive attacker can track tags, violating the location privacy of
tags’ holder. Finally, Hernandez-Castro et al. [17] recently proposed a full dis-
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closure attack, but the authors assume modular rotation instead of hamming
weight rotation.
In 2008, the Gossamer protocol [8] was proposed as a further development
upon both the UMAP family and the SASI protocol. So far, this scheme seems
the most secure ultralightweight authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags,
as no attacks have been published. As alternative to Gossamer, Lee et al. re-
cently published a new ultralightweight RFID Protocol with mutual authenti-
cation (UMA-RFID in in the following) [9]. The analysis of this recent protocol
is the subject of this paper.
3 Lee et al. Ultralightweight RFID Protocol
with Mutual Authentication
Tag, reader and back-end database are the three entities involved in the proto-
col. Each tag has a static identifier (ID). A pseudonym -dynamic temporary
identifier- (IDT ) and a secret key (K) are shared between the tag and the
reader. Indeed, the old and the potential new values of the pair {IDT,K} are
both kept in the tag to hinder desynchronization attacks. The length of the
variables is 128 bits. The channel between the tag and the reader is insecure
due to the open nature of the radio channel. In contrast, a secure channel is
assumed for the communications between the reader and the back-end database.
Tags are limited to bitwise operations (i.e. bitwise XOR, OR and AND)
and left bitwise rotation. Specifically, Rot(A,B) symbolizes that the vector A
is subjected to a circular shift of n bit positions, where n is the hamming weight
of vector B (i.e. n = hw(B)). Readers are limited to the same set of operations
and have the extra capability of random number generation.
We described the messages exchanged in the protocol below (see also Figure
1). First, the reader (R) and the tag (T ) are mutually authenticated (authenti-
cation phase). Then, the reader and the tag, respectively, update their private
information {IDT,K} shared and kept synchronized between them (updating
phase).
1. Authentication Phase
T → R : IDTi In the session i-th, the reader sends a request message to the tag.
Then, the tag backscatters its pseudonym (IDTi) to provide anonymous
identification.
R→ T : Ai, Bi Upon receiving IDTi, the reader looks up in the database the
secret key associated to T . Then, it generates a new random value Ni and
computes the authentication messages Ai and Bi:
Ai = Ki ⊕Ni (1)
Bi = Rot(Ki,Ki)⊕Rot(Ni, Ni) (2)
The reader sends {Ai, Bi} to the tag.
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Figure 1: Ultralightweight RFID Protocol with Mutual Authentication
T → R : Ci After receiving {Ai, Bi}, the tag obtains N
′
i from message Ai (N
′
i =
Ai ⊕ Ki) and computes its local version of Bi (B
′
i = Rot(Ki,Ki) ⊕
Rot(Ni, Ni)). If Bi = B
′
i, the reader is authenticated. Then, the tag
computes the authentication message Ci:
Ci = (Ki ∨Rot(Ni, Ni))⊕ ((Rot(Ki,Ki) ∧Ni) (3)
Finally, the tag sends Ci to the reader.
R: Upon receiving Ci, the reader checks its correctness to authenticate the tag.
2. Updating Phase Upon the reader authentication (messages Ai, Bi), the
tag updates its secret information when message Ci is sent. The updating
in the reader is conditioned to the valid authentication of the tag (message
Ci). Specifically, the updating phase is defined by the equations below:
IDTi+1 = Ki ⊕Rot(Ni, Ni) (4)
Ki+1 = Rot(Ki,Ki)⊕Ni (5)
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we describe the security vulnerabilities of Lee et al. protocol.
4.1 Traceability Attack
Traceability is one of the most important security threats linked to RFID tech-
nology. Location privacy is compromised when tags answer readers queries with
a constant, static value, something that curiously happens in numerous commer-
cial tags. An encrypted version of the static identifier may be used for privacy
protection, but an attacker could still track the tag’s holder as the tag keeps on
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sending a constant value. So it seems necessary to anonymize tags’ answers by
the inclusion of nonces. However, the simple use of random numbers by itself
does not guarantee that a protocol will be resistant to traceability attacks [18].
The traceability problem has attracted a lot of research. In [19], Juels and
Weis give a formal definition of the untraceability model. The same definition,
though with a style more similar to that used for security protocols, is described
by Phan in his attack against the SASI protocol [16].
In RFID schemes, tags T and readers R interact in protocol sessions. In
general terms, the adversary (A) controls the communications between all the
participants and interacts passively or actively with them. Specifically, A can
run the following queries:
 Execute(R, T , i) query. This models a passive attacker. A eavesdrops on
the channel, and gets read access to the exchange of messages between R
and T in session i of a genuine protocol execution.
 Send(X , Y, M , i) query. This models that the message M sends from X
to Y in session i is blocked or altered (e.g. flipping one bit), preventing
its correct reception.
 Test(i, T0, T1) query. This does not model any ability of A, but it is
necessary to define the untraceability test. When this query is invoked
for session i, a random bit is generated b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the pseudonym
IDT Tii from the set {IDT
T0
i , IDT
T1
i } and corresponding to tags {T0, T1}
is given to A.
Upon definition of the adversary’s abilities, the untraceability problem can
be defined as a game G divided into the following phases:
Phase 1 (Learning): A can send Execute and Send queries. So, A eavesdrops
messages -passive attack- passed over the channel and have the ability of
blocking -active attack- certain messages.
Phase 2 (Challenge): A chooses two fresh tags whose associated identifiers
are ID0 and ID1. Then he sends Test(i, T0, T1) query. As result, A is
given a dynamic temporary identifier IDT Tii from the set {IDT
T0
i , IDT
T1
i },
which depends on a chosen random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Phase 3 (Guessing) A finishes the game and outputs a bit d (d ∈ {0, 1}) as
its conjecture of the value of b.
A’s success in winning G is equivalent to the success of breaking the untrace-
ability property offered by the protocol. So the advantage of A in distinguishing
whether the messages correspond to T0 or T1, is defined as below:
AdvUNTA (t, r1, r2) = |Pr[d = b]−
1
2
| (6)
where t is a security parameter (i.e. the bit length of the key shared by the
tag and the reader) and r1 and r2 are the number of times A can run Execute
and Send queries respectively.
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Definition An RFID protocol in an RFID system (S= {Ri, T0, T1, ....}) in
which an adversary A can invoke {Execute(R, T , i), Send(X , Y, M ,i), Test( i,
T0, T1)} in a game G, offers resistance against traceability if:
AdvUNTA (t, r1, r2) < ε(t, r1, r2) (7)
ε(.) being some negligible function.
We will show how the UMA-RFID scheme does not guarantee privacy loca-
tion, being possible to track tags.
Theorem 4.1 The UMA-RFID protocol, on an RFID system (S= {Ri, T0, T1,
....}) in which an adversary A can invoke two Execute(R, T , i) queries, one
Send(X , Y, M ,i) query, and, subsequently, one Test( i, T0, T1) query in an
untraceability game G, is vulnerable to traceability attacks, since the advantage
for an adversary to win G is significant: AdvUNTA (t, 2, 1) = 0.5≫ ε(t, 2, 1).
Proof Specifically, an adversary A performs the following steps:
Phase 1 (Learning): A sends two {Execute(R, T0, i)}
n+1
i=n queries and one
Send(T0,R, C
T0
n+1, n+1) query to T0. A acquires the tuple {IDT
T0
n , A
T0
n , B
T0
n , C
T0
n }
and {IDT T0n+1} where
BT0n = Rot(K
T0
n ,K
T0
n )⊕Rot(N
T0
n , N
T0
n ) (8)
IDT T0n+1 = K
T0
n ⊕Rot(N
T0
n , N
T0
n ) (9)
Send(T , R, CT0n+1, n+1) query frustrates the correct reception of message
CT0n+1 in session n + 1, which avoids the updating of the secret key and
the pseudonym in the reader. The tag is thus identified using the old pair
{IDT T0n+1,K
T0
n+1} in the next session n+ 2.
Phase 2 (Challenge): A chooses two fresh tags whose associated identifiers
are ID0 and ID1. Then he sends a Test(n + 2, T0, T1) query. As re-
sult, A is given a dynamic temporary identifier IDT Tin+2 from the set
{IDT T0n+2, IDT
T1
n+2}, which depends on a chosen random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Phase 3 (Guessing) A finishes G and outputs a bit d (d ∈ {0, 1}) as its
conjecture of the value b. In particular, we propose the following procedure
to obtain value d:
1. From Equation (8) and (9), the following constant value associated
with T0 is obtained by the adversary:
X = BT0n ⊕ IDT
T0
n+1 = Rot(K
T0
n ,K
T0
n )⊕K
T0
n (10)
2. A calculates the XOR between the BT0n value captured in the learning
phase (Equation (8)) and the pseudonym presented in the challenge
phase:
Y =
{
BT0n ⊕ IDT
T0
n+2 = B
T0
n ⊕ IDT
T0
n+1 = X if b = 0
BT0n ⊕ IDT
T1
n+2 6= X if b = 1
(11)
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3. A utilizes the following simple decision rule:
d =
{
if X = Y d = 0
if X 6= Y d = 1
(12)
So the use of random numbers does not prevent in this case the attacker from
associating the tags’s answers with its holder, with a 100% probability of success.
4.2 Full Disclosure, Cloning, and Desynchronization At-
tacks
The tag and the reader share a secret key. The main purpose of this key is
the authentication of both entities. The key is combined with a random num-
ber to hamper its acquisition by the attacker when passed over the insecure
channel. The above idea is well conceived but the protocol abuses of the usage
of Rot(Ki,Ki) and Rot(Ni, Ni). Indeed, this fact facilitates a sort of linear
cryptanalysis of the scheme, despite of the combination of triangular and non-
triangular functions.
Theorem 4.2 In the UMA-RFID protocol, a passive attacker, after eavesdrop-
ping two consecutive authentication sessions {n, n + 1} between an authentic
tag (T ) and a genuine reader (R), can discover the secret key shared by these
two entities by simply computing an XOR among some of the public messages
transmitted over the radio channel:
Kn+1 = An ⊕Bn ⊕ IDTn+1 (13)
Proof We start describing the messages exchanged in sessions {n, n+ 1}:
Session n: {IDTn, An, Bn, Cn} where
An = Kn ⊕Nn (14)
Bn = Rot(Kn,Kn)⊕Rot(Nn, Nn) (15)
Session n+ 1: {IDTn+1, An+1, Bn+1, Cn+1} where
IDTn+1 = Kn ⊕Rot(Nn, Nn) (16)
An+1 = Kn+1 ⊕Nn+1 (17)
Bn+1 = Rot(Kn+1,Kn+1)⊕Rot(Nn+1, Nn+1) (18)
Cn+1 = (Kn+1 ∨Rot(Nn+1, Nn+1)) (19)
⊕ (Rot(Kn+1,Kn+1) ∧Nn+1) (20)
The secret key of the tag in session n+1 is described by the equation below:
Kn+1 = Rot(Kn,Kn)⊕Nn (21)
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Finally, the attacker can acquire the actual secret key (Kn+1) of the tag
by computing the XOR between the public messages An, Bn and IDTn+1 (see
Equations (14), (15) and (16)):
An ⊕Bn ⊕ IDTn+1 =
= Kn ⊕Nn ⊕Rot(Kn,Kn)⊕ Rot(Nn, Nn)⊕Kn ⊕Rot(Nn, Nn)
= (Kn ⊕Kn)⊕Nn ⊕Rot(Kn,Kn)⊕ (Rot(Nn, Nn)⊕Rot(Nn, Nn))
= (0x0)⊕Nn ⊕Rot(Kn,Kn)⊕ (0x0)
= Nn ⊕Rot(Kn,Kn) = Rot(Kn,Kn)⊕Nn = Kn+1 (22)
RFID tags are usually not designed to be tamper resistant, because this will
significantly increase their price. An active attacker may tamper with the tag
in order to read from or write to its memory in which secret values are stored.
Low-cost RFID tags cannot offer protection to this sort of attacks but should
be resistant, at least, to passive attacks. We show now how a passive attacker
is able to clone a tag after revealing the whole secrets stored in the tag, but
without requiring any physical manipulation of it.
Theorem 4.3 In the UMA-RFID protocol, a passive attacker, after eavesdrop-
ping two consecutive authentication sessions {n, n+1} between an authentic tag
(T ) and a genuine reader (R), can clone the tag by computing:
IDTn+2 = Kn+1 ⊕Rot(Nn+1, Nn+1) (23)
Kn+2 = Rot(Kn+1,Kn+1)⊕Nn+1 (24)
Proof From Theorem 2, an adversary can discover the actual secret key of
the tag (Kn+1) after eavesdropping messages {IDTn, An, Bn, Cn} exchanged in
session n and the dynamic temporary identifier (IDTn+1) in session n+ 1.
K ′n+1 = An ⊕Bn ⊕ IDTn+1 (25)
Then, the adversary can obtain the random number associated to the session
n + 1 by computing an XOR between the message An+1 and the key Kn+1.
Then, message B can be used to check its correctness.
N ′n+1 = K
′
n+1 ⊕An+1 (26)
Bn+1
?
= Rot(K ′n+1,K
′
n+1)⊕Rot(N
′
n+1, N
′
n+1) (27)
Once the actual key (Kn+1) and the random number (Nn+1) linked to session
n+1 are known by the attacker, the new state can be computed by using these
values:
IDTn+2 = K
′
n+1 ⊕Rot(N
′
n+1, N
′
n+1) (28)
Kn+2 = Rot(K
′
n+1,K
′
n+1)⊕N
′
n+1 (29)
Finally, the attacker can copy the above values to the memory of a blank tag,
which results in a cloning attack (having an undistinguishable copy of an au-
thentic tag).
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Tags and readers have to remain synchronized to run the protocol success-
fully. The authors take the extra precaution of storing the old and potential
new values of the pair {IDT,K} to fight against desynchronization attacks, but
in this case this well-known approach in the literature is not enough. Despite
of this countermeasure, an attacker is able to desynchronize a tag and a reader
exploiting Theorem 2.
Theorem 4.4 In the UMA-RFID protocol, a passive attacker, after eavesdrop-
ping two consecutive authentication sessions {n, n+ 1} and performing a man-
in-the-middle attack between an authentic tag (T ) and a genuine reader (R),
can desynchronize these two entities by sending:
An+1 = Kn+1 ⊕N
∗
n+1 (30)
Bn+1 = Rot(Kn+1,Kn+1)⊕Rot(N
∗
n+1, N
∗
n+1) (31)
Cn+1 = (Kn+1 ∨Rot(Nn+1, Nn+1))⊕ (Rot(Kn+1,Kn+1) ∧Nn+1) (32)
Proof Taking advantage of Theorem 2 any adversary, after eavesdropping mes-
sages {IDTn, An, Bn, Cn} exchanged in session n and the dynamic temporary
identifier (IDTn+1) of session n+1, gets the actual secret key of the tag (Kn+1).
K ′n+1 = An ⊕Bn ⊕ IDTn+1 (33)
Then, the attacker starts the man-in-the-middle attack. Specifically, the
attacker intercepts messages {An+1, Bn+1} (see Equations (17) and (18)) and
sends {A∗n+1, B
∗
n+1} linked to the random number N
∗
i+1:
A∗n+1 = K
′
n+1 ⊕N
∗
n+1 (34)
B∗n+1 = Rot(K
′
n+1,K
′
n+1)⊕Rot(N
∗
n+1, N
∗
n+1) (35)
Finally, the attacker intercepts the answer C∗n+1 of the tag, and computes
the answer C′n+1 to the original messages {An+1, Bn+1} sent by the genuine
reader:
N ′n+1 = K
′
n+1 ⊕An+1 (36)
Bn+1
?
= Rot(K ′n+1,K
′
n+1)⊕Rot(N
′
n+1, N
′
n+1) (37)
C′n+1 = (K
′
n+1 ∨Rot(N
′
n+1, N
′
n+1))⊕ (Rot(K
′
n+1,K
′
n+1) ∧N
′
n+1) (38)
After the mutual authentication between the tag and the reader, both enti-
ties update their internal secret values:
Tag Reader
IDTN∗n+2 = K
′
n+1 ⊕Rot(N
∗
n+1, N
∗
n+1) IDT
′
n+2 = K
′
n+1 ⊕Rot(N
′
n+1, N
′
n+1)
K∗n+2 = Rot(K
′
n+1,K
′
n+1)⊕N
∗
n+1 K
′
n+2 = Rot(K
′
n+1,K
′
n+1)⊕N
′
n+1
So the adversary deceives the tag and the reader into thinking that the
random number associated to the session n + 1 is N∗n+1 or N
′
n+1 respectively.
As a consequence of this fact, the tag a the reader lose their synchronization
after the completion of the updating phase.
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To further clarify the attacks previously described, Figures 2(a) and 2(b)
illustrate the messages exchanged.
As an easy alternatively to the last attack presented, an adversary can desyn-
chronize tags and readers using the non-resistance of bitwise operations to active
attacks [20]. The adversary can reuse old values, transmitted in the channel,
to compute new valid authentication messages. Specifically, an XOR opera-
tion between the captured value and a constant value properly selected (e.g.
Ai+1 = Ai ⊕ 0x0005) is enough to achieve this objective.
Theorem 4.5 In the UMA-RFID protocol, a passive attacker, after eavesdrop-
ping an authentication session n between an authentic tag (T ) and a genuine
reader (R), can desynchronize these two entities by sending: An+1 = An ⊕ C1,
Bn+1 = Bn⊕C2, where {Ci}
2
i=1 are any constant values whose hamming weight
is exactly 2.
Proof First, the reader eavesdrops the messages {IDTn, An, Bn, Cn} passed
over the channel in session n where
An = Kn ⊕Nn (39)
Bn = Rot(Kn,Kn)⊕Rot(Nn, Nn) (40)
After the mutual authentication, the tag and the reader update their secret
values {IDTn+1,Kn+1}. Indeed the tag stores the old and the potential new
values with the objective of preventing desynchronization attacks. However, the
adversary may exploit this fact -simulating the incorrect reception of C message
and using the old values in a new authentication- provoking a new updating in
the tag but not in the reader. Specifically, the adversary follows the experiment
described below:
1. Initialization. The adversary randomly selects the C1 value, with
the restriction that its hamming weigh is 2 (i.e. hw(C1) = 2).
2.0. Selection of the mask.] The adversary picks up a C2 value from
the subset of x ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2L} that satisfies hw(x) = 2, where L is the
length of the variables used (i.e. n = 128 in Lee et al. protocol [9]).
2.1 Authentication. The adversary computes and sends to the legiti-
mate tag the authentication messages:
An+1 = An ⊕ C1 = Kn ⊕Nn ⊕ C1 (41)
Bn+1 = Bn ⊕ C2 = Rot(Kn,Kn)⊕Rot(Nn, Nn)⊕ C2 (42)
2.2 Check of C2.If the tag accepts {An+1, Bn+1} and replies Cn+1 to
the adversary, it proves the success of the attack launched. Otherwise, the
process is repeated from Step 2.0.
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Table 1: Performance Comparison of Ultralightweight Authentication Protocols
UMAP family SASI UMA-RFID Gossamer
[1, 2, 3] [4] [9] [8]
Resistance to Desynchronization Attacks No No No Yes
Resistance to Disclosure Attacks No No No Yes
Privacy and Anonymity No No No Yes
Mutual Auth. and Forward Security Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Messages for Mutual Auth. 4-5L 4L 3L 4L
Memory Size on Tag 6L 7L 5L 7L
Memory Size for each Tag on Database 6L 4L 3L 4L
Operation Types on Tag ⊕, ∨, ∧, + ⊕, ∨, ∧, +, Rot ∧, ∨, ⊕, Rot ⊕, +, Rot,
MixBits
3. Check of C1. If Step 2 ({2.0 – 2.2}) completely fails, the process is
repeated from Step 1.
When messages {An+1, Bn+1} are accepted by the genuine tag, the tag sends
Cn+1 and updates its secret values. However, the reader, which is not involved
in the attack, keeps on storing its old values. So the reader and the tag lose
their synchronized state and this situation is irreversible.
The remaining question is to know how efficient the attack is. C1 is restricted
to having a hamming weigh of 2 in order for the hamming weigh of Nn and
Nn⊕C1 to be unknown but have a good probability of being equal. As two bits
are flipped in Nn, and Nn is a uniformly distributed random vector, the above
condition is satisfied with a probability of 1/2. Finally, the adversary has to
test with different values of C2. As the adversary does not know the hamming
weight of Nn ⊕ C1, he can not say how many bits C1 is rotated. However, he
knows that the vector resulting from this rotation has a hamming weight of
2, which is quite advantageous. Indeed, the average number of times that the
adversary has to try is CL,2 =
(
L
2
)
=
(
128
2
)
= 8128≪ 2128.
Finally, a simple comparison of ultralightweight authentication protocols is
shown in Table 1, where L designates the bit length of variables used.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we present the cryptanalysis of Lee et al. protocol, which is
one of the most recent RFID mutual authentication protocols in the area of
ultralightweight cryptography. The scheme presents noteworthy weaknesses re-
lated to most of the security properties initially required in its protocol design.
Furthermore, the protocol is an excellent example as how triangular and non-
triangular functions have to be combined to design secure ultralightweight pro-
tocols, and also about their combined usage does not guarantee any security by
itself.
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(a) Full Disclosure and Cloning Attacks
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Figure 2: Passive and Active Attacks
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